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Should a rms price respond dynamically to shifts in demand? With dynamic pricing the rm can
exploit high demand by charging a high price, and can cope with low demand by charging a low
price to more fully utilize its capacity. However, many rms announce their price in advance and
do not make adjustments in response to market conditions, i.e., they use static pricing. Therefore,
with static pricing the rm may nd that its price is either lower or higher than optimal given
the observed market condition. Nevertheless, we nd that when consumers are strategic and can
anticipate such pricing behavior, a rm may actually be better o¤ with static pricing. Dynamic
pricing can be ine¤ective because it imposes pricing risk on consumers - given that it is costly to
visit the rm, an uncertain price may cause consumers to avoid visiting the rm altogether. We
show that the advantage of static pricing relative to dynamic pricing can be substantially larger
than the advantage of dynamic pricing over static pricing. However, the superiority of dynamic
pricing can be restored if the rm sets a modest base price and then commits only to reduce its price,
i.e., it never raises its price in response to strong demand. Hence, a successful implementation of
dynamic pricing tempers the magnitude of price adjustments.
1 Introduction
Uncertainty in demand suggests that rms can benet from dynamic pricing. With dynamic
pricing a rm delays its pricing decisions until after market conditions are revealed so that the rm
can adjust prices accordingly - when demand is ample, set a high price, and when demand is weak,
set a low price. Yet, despite the apparent advantages, many rms do not adjust prices to respond
to market conditions. For example, movie theaters charge a xed price, regardless of whether the
movie turned out to be a hit or a op. Restaurants do not adjust their menu prices depending on
whether it is a busy or a slow night. Sports teams keep their seat prices xed, regardless of how
well the team is performing, or if the weather on a particular game day turns out to be good or
bad.1
1A few exceptions exist. The San Francisco Giants of the MLB and the Dallas Stars of the NHL are experimenting
with dynamic pricing techniques using a software developed by the Austin-based start-up, QCue (Branch 2009). It
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Several explanations have been provided for why rms may not adjust prices in response to
changing demand conditions (a phenomenon which is sometimes referred to as price stickiness or
price rigidity). Firms may incurmenu costs to change prices (Mankiw 1985): if it is costly to change
prices, rms naturally hesitate to change prices frequently. Menu costs were originally thought of as
the physical costs for changing prices, such as the cost to reprint restaurant menus. They can also
be interpreted to be managerial costs (information gathering and decisions-making) or customer
costs (communication and negotiation of new prices) (Zbaracki et al. 2004). Alternatively, sticky
prices may be due to consumer psychology: consumers dislike price changes, especially if they
perceive the changes to be unfair(e.g., Hall and Hitch 1939; Kahneman et al. 1986; Blinder et
al. 1998).
While menu costs and consumer psychology may play a role in pricing decisions, we present an
alternative explanation. A key component of our theory is that consumers incur visit costs -
before consumers attempt to make purchases, they must incur a cost to consider the purchase. For
example, a consumer must drive to a baseball park or must take the time to call a restaurant, etc.
Consequently, dynamic and static pricing impose di¤erent risks on consumers. With a dynamic
pricing strategy a consumer risks incurring the visit cost only to discover that the price charged is
more than she wants to pay, i.e., dynamic pricing imposes a price risk on consumers. With static
pricing a consumer may discover after visiting the rm that the rm has no capacity left to sell,
i.e., static pricing imposes rationing risk on consumers. We nd that it can be better to impose on
consumers rationing risk (via static pricing) than pricing risk (via dynamic pricing). Furthermore,
the advantage of static pricing can be substantial whereas the advantage of dynamic pricing is less
signicant.
The limitation with dynamic pricing is not that the rm may choose to lower its price when it
observes weak demand - consumers like price cuts and are therefore more willing to visit a rm that
is known for cutting its price. The drawback with dynamic pricing is that the rm may choose a
high price when demand is abundant - why incur a visit cost when you may also have to pay a high
price? This suggests a hybrid approach - the rm starts with a modest base price and commits
only to reduce the price from that level. This constraineddynamic pricing strategy is better for
the rm because it blends the demand-supply matching benets of pure dynamic pricing with the
incentives of static pricing. Hence, dynamic pricing can be a good strategy for the rm as long as
the rm is not too aggressive in its price adjustments. Otherwise, static pricing may be the better
has been reported that for Giantstickets, the price change will most likely be 25 cents to $1(Muret 2008), where
tickets range from $8 to $41. These price changes do not appear very signicant and it is not yet clear how using
the software a¤ects these teamsrevenues.
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Table 1. Summary of Consumer Types.
Segment Number Value Visit cost
High type X  F () vh c
Low type 1 vl 0
alternative, despite its rigidity to respond to changing demand conditions.
2 Model Description
A single rm with k units of capacity sells to two types of consumers, all of whom require one
unit of capacity to be served. There is a potential number of X high-value consumers, where X
is a non-negative random variable that is drawn from a cumulative distribution function F (), pdf
f (), complimentary cdf F () = 1   F () and mean  = E[X]. The high-value consumers are
non-atomistic. They have value vh for the rms service. They must incur a positive cost, c < vh,
to visit the rm (e.g., the time and e¤ort to walk to a movie theater) to purchase the service.
The visit cost need not be an explicit cost. It can also be interpreted as a mental cost to consider
an alternative or an opportunity cost  the cost of forgoing an outside option when choosing to
consider visiting the rm. All of the realized high-type consumers must decide whether or not to
visit the rm and if they do not, then they receive zero net value. We allow them to adopt mixed
strategies: let  2 [0; 1] be the probability that a high-type consumer visits the rm.
Low-value consumers are the second type of consumers. There is an ample number of them,
and each of them has vl value for the rms service. These consumers do not incur a cost to visit
the rm, which implies that the rm can always sell its entire capacity by charging vl. Therefore,
an alternative interpretation of vl is that it is the maximum price that guarantees the rm can sell
its entire capacity regardless of market conditions.2 Table 1 summarizes the consumer types.
The rm seeks to maximize revenue and consumers seek to maximize their net value, the value
of the service minus visit costs and the price paid to the rm. The sequence of events is as follows:
(1) the rm chooses a pricing strategy, which is a set of prices A, A  R+; (2) the number of
high-type consumers, X; is realized; (3) high-type consumers choose a visit strategy, ; knowing
the rms pricing strategy, A, but not the realization of X; (4) the rm observes  and X and
chooses a price, p; from among those in A; (5) all high-type consumers who visited the rm plus
2Our results continue to hold qualitatively even if low-type consumers incur a positive visit cost, as long as this
cost is su¢ ciently low. In this case, the rm cannot guarantee selling its entire capacity by charging vl. However,
if the visit cost of low type consumers is low enough, there exists a positive price that makes all low type consumers
visit and therefore guarantees that the entire capacity can be sold.
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the low-type consumers observe p and decide to purchase if p is no greater than their value for
the service; and (6) if there are more than k high-type consumers who want to purchase, the k
units are randomly rationed among them, i.e., they have priority over the low-types (our allocation
rule). In step (4) the rm chooses the revenue maximizing price from the set A given  and X :
p = arg maxp2A fR (p; x; )g, where x is the realization of X and
R (p; x; ) =
8<:
pk p  vl
pmin fx; kg ; if vl < p  vh
0 p > vh
:
Note, the rm sells units only at a single price (the rm does not have the ability to price discrimi-
nate). If fewer than k units of capacity are sold, the remainder earns zero revenue. Our rationing
rule (that the high types have priority over the low types) has also been adopted by Su and Zhang
(2008) and Tereya¼go¼glu and Veeraraghavan (2009). This allocation rule simplies the analysis, but
is not critical for our results. In fact, we later argue that any other allocation may only strengthen
our main result.
We do not a priori restrict the number of prices in A. They can be thought of as commonly
established price points in the market. We say the rm uses a static pricing strategy when the
rm includes only a singe price in its set, A = fpsg : Given that there is only one choice in A,
consumers know exactly what the price will be before they choose whether or not to visit. We
say the rm uses a dynamic pricing strategy when A includes two or more prices that could be
observed for some realizations of  and X: Even though consumers are charged only one price,
the price is dynamic in the sense that it is chosen from a set of possible prices based on updated
information (the realization of demand). Section 4 studies the static pricing strategy and section
5 studies a particular dynamic pricing strategy, A = R+: Section 6 compares these two strategies
and section 7 considers a broader set of dynamic pricing strategies.
3 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature on dynamic pricing with exogenous demand, i.e., situations in which
the pricing strategy does not inuence how many customers visit the rm, when they consider
purchasing or their valuations for the rms service. See Elmaghraby and Keskinicak (2003) for
a review. With exogenous demand the question is not whether dynamic pricing is better than
static pricing (it clearly is) but rather how to implement dynamic pricing (when to change prices
and by how much), how much better is dynamic pricing and under what conditions is dynamic
pricing substantially better. However, dynamic pricing does not clearly dominate static pricing
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when consumers are strategic.
Several papers discuss dynamic versus static pricing in the context of multi-period models with
strategic consumers. These consumers pose a challenge to the rm because they can time when they
purchase - they will not buy at a high price if they can anticipate that the price will be substantially
lower later on. With dynamic pricing the rm cannot commit to not lower its price, whereas with
static pricing the rm commits to a price path that does not include substantial price reductions.
It is precisely this commitment that confers an advantage to static pricing over dynamic pricing,
as shown formally by Besanko and Winston (1990). However, their model has no uncertainty in
either the number of consumers or their valuations, nor a capacity constraint. An important virtue
of dynamic pricing is that it enables the rm to better match its supply to its uncertain demand.
Hence, there is a tradeo¤ between committing to limited price reductions (thereby encouraging
consumers to buy early on at a high price) and responding to updated demand information so
as to maximize revenue given constrained capacity. This tension is explored by Dasu and Tong
(2006), Aviv and Pazgal (2008) and Cachon and Swinney (2009). In models with xed capacity,
Dasu and Tong (2006) and Aviv and Pazgal (2008) nd that neither scheme dominates and the
performance gap between them is generally small. Cachon and Swinney (2009) allow the rm to
adjust its capacity and nds that dynamic pricing is generally better. The key di¤erences between
our model and these papers is that our consumers incur visit costs and our rm only chooses a
single price. Hence, consumers do not consider when to buy (there is only a single opportunity
to buy), but rather they consider whether to incur a cost to visit the rm. Consequently, in our
model static pricing is not used to prevent strategic waiting but rather to encourage consumers
to participate in the market. However, like those other papers, our rm has limited capacity and
potential demand is uncertain, so dynamic pricing is better than static pricing at matching supply
to demand.
Like Cachon and Swinney (2009), Liu and van Ryzin (2008) and Su and Zhang (2008) allow the
rm to control capacity to prevent strategic waiting for discounts - with less inventory consumers
face greater rationing risk if they wait. However, in these papers the rm implements a static
pricing policy, and they do not consider dynamic pricing.
As in our model, in Dana and Petruzzi (2001), Çil and Lariviere (2007), Alexandrov and Lariv-
iere (2008) and Su and Zhang (2009) consumers incur a visit cost before they can transact with the
rm. Dana and Petruzzi (2001) have xed prices and focus instead on how visit costs inuence the
rms capacity choice. Çil and Lariviere (2007) studies the allocation of capacity across two market
segments and Alexandrov and Lariviere (2008) study why rms may o¤er reservations. Prices are
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exogenously xed in both of those papers. In Su and Zhang (2009) a rm chooses a price and a
capacity before observing potential demand. Consumers observe the rms price before choosing
whether to incur a visit cost, but they do not observe the rms capacity nor the number of con-
sumers in the market. In contrast, in our model the rm chooses a set of potential prices before
observing potential demand and then chooses its actual price (constrained by initial decision) after
observing potential demand. Furthermore, in our model the rms capacity is xed and known to
consumers. Hence, our model is suitable for comparing static versus dynamic pricing whereas Su
and Zhang (2009) focus on capacity commitments and availability guarantees (and cannot compare
static versus dynamic pricing).
Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) study price postponement, which is related to our dynamic pric-
ing strategy - the rm chooses a price after learning some updated demand information. However,
they do not consider strategic consumer behavior (their demand is exogenous), so price postpone-
ment is always benecial in their setting, unlike in our model.
Other papers that compare between di¤erent pricing schemes when consumers are strategic
include single versus priority pricing (Harris and Raviv 1981), subscription versus per-use pricing
(Barro and Romer 1987; Cachon and Feldman 2010), and markdown regimes with and without
reservations (Elmaghraby et al. 2006). In all of these papers the rm selects its pricing strategy
before learning some updated demand information, whereas in our study we allow the rm to choose
a price after potential demand is observed.
4 Static Pricing Strategy
With a static pricing strategy, the rm chooses a single price, p; to include in A before observing
demand, so consumers know that the price will indeed be p before deciding whether or not to visit
the rm. All high-value consumers who visit the rm receive a net value equal to vh  p  c if they
obtain a unit, and if they do not obtain a unit, their net value is  c: A customer visits the rm if
net utility is not negative, i.e., if
 (vh   p)  c; (1)
where  is the customers expectation for the probability of getting a unit conditional on visiting
the rm.  is determined by the underlining potential demand distribution, X; the high-value
customersstrategy, , and the rationing rule used to allocate scarce capacity. All else being equal,
as  increases, more high-type customers will visit the rm, thereby reducing the chance that any
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one of them will get a unit. In particular,
 =
SX (k)

=
S (k=)

; (2)
where SD (q) = ED[min fD; qg] is the sales function and S () is shorthand for SX (). Note that
S (k=) = is the rms ll rate, or the fraction of high-customer demand who visits the rm that
the rm is able to satisfy. This probability accounts for the observation that, conditional on being
in the market, a consumer is more likely to be in a market with a large number of consumers (and
therefore have a low chance to get a unit) than in a market with a few number of consumers (and
therefore have a high chance to get a unit). See Deneckere and Peck (1995) and Dana (2001) for a
more detailed discussion of why the ll rate correctly expresses the probability of receiving a unit
given our allocation rule.
With nite capacity,  < 1 is surely possible, i.e., under static pricing consumers face a rationing
risk when they visit the rm.
Denition 1 A high-type consumer faces a rationing risk if there is a chance that the consumer
will not be able to obtain the unit at a price which is strictly lower than the consumers value for
the unit.
A symmetric equilibrium strategy for high-type consumers is a b 2 [0; 1] such that b is optimal
for each consumer given that all other consumers choose b as their strategy. If p is low enough,
there is an equilibrium in which all high-type consumers visit the rm, i.e., b = 1. From (1) and
(2), that occurs if
S (k)

(vh   p)  c
or
p  vh   c
S (k)
= p.
If p > p, the unique symmetric equilibrium has b < 1, where b is the unique solution to
S (k=b) = c
vh   p; (3)
or, alternatively,
p = vh   c
S (k=b) :
In this case, for every price p there exists a unique b(p) that satises 3 and is decreasing in p.
Using (3) the rms revenue function can be written as a function of b alone. Dene Rhs (b) as the
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rms revenue function from only high-type customers:
Rhs (b) = SbX (k)vh   cS (k=b)

(4)
= bS (k=b) vh   bc
Observe that the rst term in 4 is the expected value high-type consumers receive, accounting for
the possibility of rationing and the second term is the sure visit costs they incur. Hence, Rhs (b)
is the high-type consumerstotal welfare. Consequently, restricting attention to only high-type
consumers, the rm chooses a price that both maximizes its revenue as well as consumer welfare.
That is, by charging a single price the rm is able to extract all consumer welfare.
The next lemma nds the equilibrium fraction of high-type consumers who visit the rm under
static pricing, s. If c is su¢ ciently low, all customers visit the rm. Otherwise, a fraction of the
high-type customers visit. (This and all subsequent proofs are provided in the appendix.)
Lemma 1 With static pricing, the rms revenue function from high-type consumers, Rhs (b) ; is
concave. Let s = arg maxR
h
s (b) : (i) if vh R k0 xf (x) dx  c, then s = 1 and phs = ps; otherwise
(ii) s is the unique solution to
vh
Z k=s
0
xf (x) dx = c (5)
and
phs = vh  
c
S (k=s)
:
Instead of choosing phs and selling only to high type consumers, the rm also has the option to
choose ps  vl; in which case the rms sells all its capacity and its revenue is psk: Clearly, ps = vl
is optimal among the prices that guarantee full utilization.
The rms optimal price, ps; is either phs or vl. It can be shown that R
h
s (s) = kvhF (k=s).
Thus, ps = phs when vhF (k=s)  vl, otherwise ps = vl: In the former case, revenue is independent
of vl; whereas in the latter case it is linearly increasing in vl:
5 Dynamic Pricing Strategy
With a dynamic pricing strategy the rm chooses its price, from a set of possible options, after
observing  (the fraction of consumers who visit the rm) and x (the realization of high-type
demand). We consider in this section a particular dynamic pricing strategy in which the rm
imposes no a priori constraint on the price it can choose, A = R+: Given this strategy, the rms
optimal price is either vh or vl : demand is inelastic in p  vl and vl < p  vh; so it is optimal to
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set a price equal to the maximum of one of those two ranges. Note, consumer and rm behavior
would not change if the pricing strategy were A = fvl; vhg: Section 7 considers other dynamic
pricing strategies.
Given A = R+; the rm can price at p = vl and earn revenue vlk. Alternatively, it can price
at p = vh and earn revenue vhx. Consequently, the rm chooses p = vl when
x  vl
vh
k

; (6)
which has probability F (vlk=(vh)) and chooses p = vh, otherwise.
Observe that high value consumers only earn positive utility if the price is vl and they are able
to obtain the unit. In all other cases, consumers get zero surplus. Thus, to nd the high-type
consumers surplus from visiting the rm, we let  be the high-type consumers expectation for
the probability that the rm charges vl and he is able to get a unit. A high value consumer is
indi¤erent towards visiting the rm if
 (vh   vl) = c: (7)
As in the discussion of Section 4, in equilibrium, the belief about the probability  has to be
consistent with the actual probability. Given our rationing rule, because vl is charged only when
x  vlvhk < k (from 6), high type consumers are guaranteed to get the unit when the price is vl.
(They may not be able to get the unit if the price if vh, but in this case, their surplus is zero.)
Thus, according to Denition 1, under dynamic pricing consumers do not face a rationing risk.
However, they do face a price risk.
Denition 2 A high-type consumer faces a price risk if the consumer does not know which price
will be charged when the consumer chooses whether to visit the rm.
With dynamic pricing, high-type consumers know that if they visit the rm, they will be able
to obtain the unit if the price is low (no rationing risk), but they do not know what price will be
charged. With other allocation rules, the high-type consumer may not be guaranteed to obtain a
unit conditional that the price is low, i.e., the high-type consumer may also face a rationing risk.
Consequently, with other allocation rules high-type consumers may be less inclined to visit the rm
and the rms revenue could be lower than what is achieved with our allocation rule.
The actual probability a high-type consumer obtains a unit at p = vl therefore is the proba-
bility that the rm charges that price, conditional that the high type consumer is in the market.
Because the market size, X, is uncertain, conditional on his presence in the market, a high type
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consumers demand density is xf (x) = (following Deneckere and Peck 1995). Therefore, this
consumer anticipates that the price will be vl with probability
 =
R vlvh k
0 xf (x) dx

. (8)
Note that   F (vlk=(vh)): if a high-type customer is in the market, the probability that demand
is low (which implies that the price charged is vl) is lower than the unconditional probability.
If vl < vh   c, then there exists some  that satises (8). If vl  vh   c, then  = 0 is the
optimal strategy for consumers: if the utility from visiting is less than the lowest possible price,
the consumer never visits. As that case is not interesting, we assume vl < vh   c. Let d be
the fraction of high-type consumers who visit the rm in equilibrium under dynamic pricing. The
following lemma characterizes d.
Lemma 2 The fraction of high-type consumers who visit the rm in equilibrium, d, is unique.
Furthermore, (i) d = 1, if Z vl
vh
k
0
xf (x) dx  c
vh   vl ;
and (ii) otherwise, d is the solution to
(vh   vl)
Z vl
vh
k
d
0
xf (x) dx = c: (9)
Observe, that while the value of vl did not factor into the solution of s, it denitely a¤ects the
fraction of high-type consumers who visit the rm under dynamic pricing.
Lemma 3 The following limits hold: (i) limvl!0 d (vl) = 0; and (ii) limvl!vh c d (vl) = 0. Fur-
thermore, if F () is an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) distribution, the fraction of
consumers who visit the rm in equilibrium under dynamic pricing, d (vl), is quasi-concave.
Lemma 3 shows that when vl is either very low or very high, high-type consumers do not visit
the rm under dynamic pricing. If vl ! vh  c, consumers know that whether the price charged is
vl or vh, they will obtain no utility from the product, and therefore they decide not to visit. When
vl ! 0 high-type consumers can potentially obtain the highest surplus. However, consumers
anticipate that in this case there is little chance that the rm will choose p = vl. Hence, they
decide not to visit the rm.
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The rms revenue with dynamic pricing is
Rd = F

vl
vh
k
d

vlk + vhd
Z k
d
vl
vh
k
d
xf (x) dx+ F

k
d

vhk
= vhk   vhd
Z k
d
vl
vh
k
d
F (x) dx
= vlk + vhd

S

k
d

  S

vl
vh
k
d

;
where d is characterized in Lemma 2. The next lemma characterizes the revenue function at the
boundaries of vl.
Lemma 4 The following limits hold: (i) limvl!0Rd = 0; and (ii) limvl!vh cRd = (vh   c) k.
6 Comparison between Static and Dynamic Pricing
Holding the consumers strategy, ; xed dynamic pricing is clearly superior - after observing the
realization of demand, x; the rm can decide whether it makes sense to choose a high price, vh; and
possibly not fully utilize its capacity, or to choose a low price, vl; and sell all of its capacity. Static
pricing does not give the rm the exibility to optimally respond to realized demand. However, the
consumers strategy is not xed - it depends on the set of potential prices the rm initially chooses,
A: With static pricing consumers face a rationing risk but not a price risk, whereas with dynamic
pricing they face a price risk but not a rationing risk. According to the Theorem 1, the price risk
associated with A = R+ leads to lower potential demand than the rationing risk of static pricing.
Hence, with static pricing the rm enjoys higher potential demand but the inability to optimally
respond to it, whereas with dynamic pricing the rm has exibility to respond but receives less
potential demand.
Theorem 1 The fraction of consumers who visit the rm under dynamic pricing is lower than
under static pricing.
To understand the di¤erence between the visiting behavior in equilibrium under the two pricing
schemes, observe that, in equilibrium, the fraction of consumers who visit the rm under static
pricing is given by (5) and can be written as
vh
R k
s
0 xf (x) dx

= c; (10)
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Table 2. Parameter values used in the numerical study.
Parameter Values
Demand distribution Gamma
 1
 f0:25; 0:5; ; 1:5; 2g
k f0:1; 0:5; ; 2; 5g
c f0:01; 0:1; 0:25; 0:5; 0:75; 0:9; 0:99g
vh 1
The left-hand side of (10) is the utility of a high-type consumer when the rm chooses a market
clearing price, which is zero if demand is less than capacity and vh otherwise. Hence, (10) can be
interpreted in terms of prices - it is as if the consumer expects that the price will be zero if demand
is less than capacity (generating a utility of vh) and that the price will be vh if capacity is binding
(generating a utility of zero). With dynamic pricing, the fraction of consumers who visit the rm
is given by (9) and can be written as
(vh   vl)
R vlvh kd
0 xf (x) dx

= c: (11)
Now the consumer expects that the price will be vl  0 if demand is less than (vl=vh)(k=d);
i.e., there is a smaller chance of a smaller discount than with static pricing, implying that fewer
consumers choose to visit with dynamic pricing.
Although static pricing generates higher demand, it does not always charge the highest price,
so it may not yield the highest revenue. The following theorem states that static pricing indeed
generates higher revenue than dynamic pricing when vl is su¢ ciently low because high-type con-
sumers anticipate that the rm is unlikely to charge vl when it is low and therefore they decide not
to visit the rm. With static pricing consumers always anticipate some surplus from visiting, so
some visit and some revenue can be gained. When vl is su¢ ciently high, the two schemes generate
the same revenue because they both charge vl and always sell all of their capacity.
Theorem 2 There exists a evl, such that Rs (vl) > Rd (vl) for all vl < evl. Further, Rs (vh   c) =
Rd (vh   c) = (vh   c) k.
To obtain additional results comparing Rs to Rd, we construct 175 instances using all combi-
nations of ; ; k; c and vh in Table 2. For all instances, we observe that Rd increases monotonically
with vl, despite that fact that fewer high-type consumers visit the rm as vl gets large (i.e., the
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Figure 1. Revenue functions under static (Rs) and dynamic (R

d) pricing as a function of vl for
X  Gamma (1; 1), vh = 1, k = 0:5, c = 0:1.
higher per unit revenue from an increase in vl dominates any reduction in high-type consumer
demand). Therefore, for the remainder of our analysis, we assume revenue with dynamic pric-
ing is increasing in vl:3 Given (A1), it can be shown that there exists a unique evl such that
Rs (vl) > Rd (vl) for all vl < evl and Rs (vl)  Rd (vl) for all vl  evl.
Assumption 1 (A1) Revenue with dynamic pricing is increasing in vl; i.e., R0d (vl) > 0 8vl:
Figure 1 illustrates the revenue functions under both pricing schemes as a function of vl for
one of the instances in our study. The advantage of static pricing is greatest when vl = 0: The
advantage of dynamic pricing is greatest when vl = bvl; where bvl = vhF (k=s) (i.e., bvl is the smallest
vl for which the rm charges ps = vl under static pricing). We dene s = Rs (0) Rd (0) = Rs (0)
and d = Rd (bvl)   Rs (bvl) and compare these measures in our sample. The results, reported in
Table 3, are consistent with the observation from Figure 1: the advantage of Rs over Rd is indeed
more signicant than the advantage of Rd over R

s. In all cases s > d and at best d is at most
70.4% of s: On average, d is only a little more than a tenth of s.
The value evl provides another measure of the relative advantage of static over dynamic pricing:
a large value of evl indicates that static pricing is superior to dynamic pricing over a large set of
parameters. We rst consider how capacity, k; inuences evl: With static pricing, as k decreases,
the probability to obtain the unit decreases, so consumers face a higher rationing risk. With
dynamic pricing, as k decreases, the rm is less likely to charge vl, so consumers face a higher
3 It is di¢ cult to analytically show that the dynamic pricing function is increasing in vl because (i) the function
d (vl) is not monotone in vl; and (ii) usual methods (such as the Envelope Theorem) cannot be applied on the
dynamic pricing revenue function because it is not obtained through optimization, but rather is a consequence of
equilibrium behavior.
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Table 3. Summary statistics of the maximum benet of using dynamic pricing, d, relative to the
maximum benet of using static pricing, s (in %).
d=s
average 11:86%
standard deviation 16:02%
minimum 6:8  10 3%
maximum 70:40%
price risk. Under both pricing schemes, the decrease of k negatively a¤ects consumers visiting
behavior. For all instances of Table 2, we observe that evl increases when the level of capacity
decreases implying that the price risk e¤ect is stronger than the rationing risk, i.e., static pricing is
favored over dynamic pricing as capacity decreases. Now consider how the visit cost, c; inuencesevl:
Lemma 5 The following hold: (i) When c = 0, s = d = 1 and Rs (vl)  Rd (vl) 8vl; and (ii)
limc!vh s = limc!vh d = 0 and R

s (vl) = R

d (vl) = vlk 8vl.
Lemma 5 shows that when the cost to visit the rm is either negligible or very high, dynamic
pricing dominates static pricing. When c ! 0, all high-type consumers visit the rm regardless
of the pricing strategy. In this case, dynamic pricing naturally performs better. When c !
vh, the visit cost is so high that high-type consumers do not visit the rm. Thus, under both
pricing schemes the rm is better o¤ charging vl and selling all its capacity (i.e., the two schemes
are equivalent). Finally, we observe that as the visit cost, c, increases, evl rst increases and
then decreases. Therefore, the range of vl for which static pricing dominates is the largest for
intermediate values of c. Figure 2 illustrates this, by plotting evl= (vh   c) as a function of c for
di¤erent capacity levels, where X  Gamma (1; 1) and vh = 1. Note that the value of evl= (vh   c)
measures the fraction below which static pricing performs better than dynamic pricing. Each line
represents the value of evl= (vh   c) for a di¤erent capacity level. For example, when k = 2 and
c = 0:2, static pricing is strictly better than dynamic pricing in 30% of the vl parameter range.
Finally, consider how the coe¢ cient of variation a¤ects the value of evl. Assuming that the
number of high-type consumers is Gamma distributed provides a simple way to numerically test
how a change in the coe¢ cient of variation a¤ects evl. The coe¢ cient of variation is dened as
CV = =, where  is the standard deviation of X. For all instances of Table 2, we observe that evl
increases as CV decreases. This suggests that pricing dynamically becomes more favorable (in the
sense that the range for which dynamic pricing dominates increases) when the high-type consumer
14
Figure 2. The threshold ~vl= (vh   c) as a function of c for X  Gamma (1; 1), vh = 1 and di¤erent values
of k.
demand uncertainty rises. To summarize, static pricing is more likely to be better than dynamic
pricing (in the sense that evl is large relative to vh   c) for low values of capacity and demand
uncertainty and for intermediate values of visit cost.
7 Generalized dynamic pricing
The previous section demonstrates that static pricing can perform better than dynamic pricing
when vl is low relative to vh. But we considered one particular dynamic pricing strategy, A = R+.
This section considers whether there exists a better dynamic pricing strategy. To this end, we now
allow the rm to choose which prices to include in the set A. Recall that static and dynamic
pricing are special cases of this scheme: under static pricing the rm selects a single price A = fpsg
and under dynamic pricing the rm selects all possible prices, A = R+.
Theorem 3 For every A; there exists a subset B = fpl; phg where pl 2 A; ph 2 A such that
max
p2A
fR (p; x; )g = max
p2B
fR (p; x; )g :
Furthermore, pl = supp2A fp  vlg and ph = supp2A fp  vhg.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that within the general set of pricing strategies, it is su¢ cient for the
rm to consider only pricing strategies in which the rm commits to at most two prices before
demand is realized. To explain, recall that there are two types of consumers and the rm must
choose the optimal price among the preannounced feasible set, A, after observing the realization of
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demand. Thus, no matter how many prices are in A, after observing demand, either the rm will
choose pl 2 A, where pl is the highest price in A that low-type consumers will buy at, or the rm will
choose ph 2 A, where ph is the highest price in A that high-type consumers will buy at. High-type
consumers anticipate this and thus, their equilibrium joining behavior under set A is equivalent to
their equilibrium joining behavior under set B = fpl; phg. As an example, the dynamic pricing
strategy A = R+ is equivalent to the dynamic pricing strategy Bd = fvl; vhg. Therefore, we can
restrict attention to the subset of the pricing schemes A, in which the rm preannounces at most
two prices.
Denote the allowable prices under static and dynamic pricing by Bs = fpsg and Bd = fvl; vhg,
respectively. Moreover, let Rfpl;phg be the revenue function when the set of prices fpl; phg is
announced, pl  vl and vl < ph  vh. The revenue function is given by:
Rfpl;phg = plk + phg

S

k
g

  S

pl
ph
k
g

;
where g is given by
vh   ph

S

k
g

+
ph   pl

Z pl
ph
k
g
0
xf (x) dx = c
Theorem 4 The following properties hold:
1. Rfvl;psg  Rs.
2. Rfvl;phg  Rfpl;phg 8pl  vl.
The rst statement of Theorem 4 implies that static pricing is always dominated by a dynamic
strategy in which the rm announces fvl; psg : Relative to static pricing, Bs; with that scheme
more consumers visit the rm (because they anticipate that they may be charged vl) and the rm
gains the capability to choose the better price to respond to demand conditions. Thus, when the
rm can reduce its price, dynamic pricing can actually work better for both consumers and the
rm. In fact, the second part of the theorem suggests that the problem with Bd = fvl; vhg is not
with the lower price: holding the high price xed, the rms best low price is the highest possible
low price, vl: (Note, this is not immediately obvious because the high-type consumers are more
likely to visit with pl < vl than with pl = vl:) Thus, the concern with Bd = fvl; vhg is with the
high price, vh: While ph < vh generates lower revenue for the rm per sale than ph = vh; more
high-type consumers are likely to visit with ph < vh: Hence, revenue with ph < vh may be higher
than with ph = vh:
16
If d = 1; then it is not possible to improve upon Bd = fvl; vhg: all high-type consumers join
and revenue is maximized in all realizations of demand. However, among all 175 instances of Table
2,when d < 1; we always nd there exists a price ph < vh such that Rfvl;phg > R

d: In other
words, the dynamic pricing strategy Bd = fvl; vhg can be improved by committing to leave the
high-type consumers with some surplus no matter which price is chosen - the problem with the
dynamic pricing strategy Bd = fvl; vhg is that the high price can be too high.
We are now in a position to dene a better dynamic pricing strategy. Let ph = arg maxph Rfvl;phg
and Bg = fvl; phg. That is, ph is the optimal high price and Rfvl;phg is the maximum revenue that
can be achieved under the generalized scheme. We refer to Bg as constrained dynamic pricing
because the rm a priori constrains itself to not charge the highest possible price - when demand is
high the rm may prefer to charge vh; but due to its initial commitment, it is restricted to choose
ph  vh: In addition to earning more revenue, the key distinction between Bg and Bd is that with
Bg the rm must be able to commit to choose a price that everyone knows may be sub-optimal once
demand is realized whereas such a commitment is not necessary with Bd: Without that ability to
commit, the rm is relegated to choose the only dynamic pricing strategy that is sub-game perfect,
Bd:
Whether a rm can commit to Bg = fvl; phg may depend on how it is implemented. One way
to implement Bg is to announce vl as the list price(or regular price) and commit to charge the
list price or to charge the moderately higher price, ph: More naturally, the rm can announce p

h
as the list price and commit to charge either that list price or a lower price (and the lower price
will be vl): It seems plausible that rms, through repeated dynamics, may be be able to commit
to only mark down their prices. In fact, this policy (sometimes referred to as asymmetric price
adjustments), is both empirically observed and theoretically assumed (e.g., Aviv and Pazgal 2008;
Liu and Van Ryzin 2008; Su and Zhang 2008). Our theory provides an explanation for this e¤ect
beyond consumers dislike price increases- by committing to leave consumers with some surplus
in all states, the rm is ensuring that a su¢ cient number of consumers will actually make the e¤ort
to visit the rm.
Static pricing, Bs = fpsg, also requires a commitment on the part of the rm (to neither mark
up or mark down). Figure 3 illustrates that the commitment to not mark up is more important
than the commitment to not mark down, as Bg = fvl; phg generates higher revenue than both
static, Bs; and dynamic pricing, Bd:
It is straightforward to show that limvl!0Rfvl;phg = limvl!0R

s (vl) and that limvl!vh cRfvl;phg =
limvl!vh cR

s (vl) = limvl!vh cR

d (vl). In addition, for each parameter combination, our numeri-
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Figure 3. Revenue functions under static (Rs), dynamic (Rd) and the generalized (Rfvl;phg) pricing
schemes as a function of vl for X  Gamma(1; 1); vh = 1; k = 0:5; c = 0:1.
Table 4. Summary statistics of the maximum benet of using either static or dynamic pricing relative to
the maximum benet of using the constrained dynamic pricing policy (in %).
Rs (evl) =Rfevl;phg max fRs (vl) ; Rd (vl)g =Rfvl;phg
average 77:4% 93%
standard deviation 13:0% 10:7%
minimum 58:2% 58:2%
maximum 99:7% 100%
cal results found that implementing the constrained dynamic pricing policy is most benecial when
vl = evl (i.e., the vl where Rs = Rd). Column 2 in Table 4 documents the ratio Rs (evl) =Rfevl;phg;
where note that Rs (evl) = Rd (evl). This ratio measures the worst case performance of the best
simple pricing scheme relative to the optimal generalized scheme. We nd that in the worst case,
either static or dynamic pricing yields only 77.4% of the revenue generated by constrained dynamic
pricing. As this is the worst case scenario, we are also interested in the average benet for di¤erent
values of vl. To this end, for each instance in 2 we consider the eleven vl such that the ratio of vl
to vh is taken from the following set:
f0:01; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9; 0:99g :
If a resulting vl exceeds vh  c; we exclude it from the analysis, which leaves us with 925 instances.
Column 3 in Table 4 reports the relative advantage of constrained dynamic pricing over the two
simpler policies and indicates that on average, the simpler policies yield 7% less revenue than
constrained dynamic pricing.
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Figure 4. Worst case performance of dynamic or static pricing relative to the constrained dynamic pricing
policy as a function of the visit cost, c, for di¤erent values of the coe¢ cient of variation, CV .
Furthermore, we nd that the relative advantage of constrained dynamic pricing is greatest when
the visit cost, c, or the demand uncertainty (measured by the coe¢ cient of variation, CV = =)
are high, as illustrated in Figure 4.
8 Conclusion
We explain why a rm may prefer static pricing over dynamic pricing when consumers are strategic
and decide whether to consider to purchase based on the rms chosen pricing strategy. By
charging a static price a rm imposes a rationing risk on consumers whereas a rm that changes
prices dynamically imposes a price risk on consumers. Imposing a rationing risk on consumers
can dominate, especially when consumers valuations for the product are highly variable. The
problem with dynamic pricing is that the rm may charge a high price that leaves consumers with
zero surplus, so the rm can improve its revenues by implementing a pricing strategy that leaves
consumers with a positive surplus in all states of demand. Overall, we conclude that even though
dynamic pricing responds better to demand conditions, charging a static price can be the preferable
pricing strategy when consumers are strategic. However, constrained dynamic pricing is an even
better strategy - charge either a reasonable list price or mark down from that list price, but never
mark up.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that the expected sales function is given by
S (k=) =
Z k=
0
xf (x) dx+
k

F

k


and that
S0 (k=) =
dS (k=)
d
=   k
2
F

k


Di¤erentiating Rhs () with respect to , we get:
s () =
dRhs ()
d
= vh
 
S (k=) + S0 (k=)
  c
= vh
Z k=
0
xf (x) dx  c:
Rhs () is concave because s () is decreasing in . The optimal s may be 1 (a corner solution)
if s (1)  0 (result (i)) or interior, in which case solving the rst-order condition s () = 0 gets
the result (ii). Note that s 6= 0, because we assume that vh > c.
Proof of Lemma 2. Under dynamic pricing, the indi¤erent consumer solves
R vlvh k
0 xf (x) dx

(vh   vl) = c: (12)
As the left-hand-side (LHS) strictly decreases with  and the right-hand-side (RHS) is constant,
there either exists a unique  2 [0; 1] which solves (12), or, if (vh   vl)
R vlvh k
0 xf (x) dx > c, there
does not exist a  which solves (12), in which case d = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Limit calculations: (i) Let h0 (x) = xf (x) so that h () =
R 
0 xf (x) dx.
Therefore, from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus,
R vlvh kd
0 xf (x) dx = h

vl
vh
k
d

  h (0) =
h

vl
vh
k
d

(because h (0) = 0). Note that h0 () > 0 and thus invertible. From (12), we can write
h

vl
vh
k
d

= c= (vh   vl) and
h 1

c
vh   vl

=
vl
vh
k
d
:
Rearranging, we get:
d =
vl
vh
k
h 1

c
vh vl
 :
h 1

c
vh vl

> 0, since c= (vh   vl) > 0; h (0) = 0 and h0 (x) > 0. Thus, taking the limit, we get
limvl!0 d = 0. (ii) Rearranging (12) and letting vl ! vh  c, we get that for (12) to hold, we must
have limvl!vh c
R vlvh kd(vl)
0 xf (x) dx = , which implies that limvl!vh c  (vl) = 0.
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To show that d (vl) is quasi-concave, write:
F = (vh   vl)
Z vl
vh
k
d
0
xf (x) dx  c:
Note that if condition (12) holds, F = 0. Di¤erentiating F and applying the Implicit Function
Theorem, we get:
@F
@vl
=

vh   vl
vl

vl
vh
k
d
2
f

vl
vh
k
d

 
Z vl
vh
k
d
0
xf (x) dx;
@F
@d
=  

vh   vl
d

vl
vh
k
d
2
f

vl
vh
k
d

and
@d
@vl
=
d
vl

1  vl
R y
0 xf (x) dx
(vh   vl) y2f (y)

(13)
=
d
vl
 
1 +
vl
vh   vl
 
F (y)
yf (y)
 
R y
0 F (x) dx
y2f (y)
!!
;
where y = vlvh
k
d
. Observe rst that d=vl is decreasing in vl (and therefore that y is increasing in
vl). To see this, note that
d
vl
=
k
vh
h 1

c
vh vl
 ;
which is decreasing in vl because h 1 is increasing. Equating (13) to zero and rearranging, we get:
 vh   vl
vl
=

1
y

F (y)
yf (y)
 
y  
R y
0 F (x) dx
F (y)
!
:
Note that the LHS is increasing. The rst term on the RHS is decreasing and the second terms is
decreasing as well, because F is IGFR. Di¤erentiating the third term with respect to y, we get:
1  F
2
(y) + f (y)
R y
0 F (x) dx
F
2
(y)
=  f (y)
R y
0 F (x) dx
F
2
(y)
< 0,
and therefore it is decreasing as well. Thus, the RHS is decreasing. Together with the fact that
d = 0 in the limits and that d  0, we get the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 4. The results immediately follow from the limits of Lemma 3.
Proof of Theorem 1. To establish the result, assume rst that s and d are interior. Denote
the LHS of (5) and the LHS of (9) by  s () and d (), respectively. Observe that  s () > d ()
8: Furthermore,  0s () < 0 and  0d () < 0. Since the RHS of both conditions is the same, the
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result follows. Also note that the conditions for boundary solutions are such that
vh
Z k
0
xf (x) dx > (vh   vl)
Z vl
vh
k
0
xf (x) dx;
implying that we must have that s  d (vl) 8vl.
Proof of Theorem 2. Rs (vl) = kmax

vhF (k=s) ; vl
	
. Therefore, Rs (vh   c) = kmax

vhF (k=s) ; vh   c
	
.
To show that Rs (vh   c) = k (vh   c), it remains to show that vh   c  vhF (k=s). Combining
with (10), it remains to show that
F (k=s) 
R k
s
0 xf (x) dx

: (14)
The LHS represents the probability that demand is less than k=s, where the RHS represents the
same probability conditional on a high-type consumer being in the market and hence (14) must
hold.
lim
vl!vh c
Rd (vl) = limvl!vh c
F

vl
vh
k
d

vlk + lim
vl!vh c
vhd
Z k
d
vl
vh
k
d
xf (x) dx+ lim
vl!vh c
F

k
d

vhk
= (vh   c) k;
where the last equality follows because limvl!vh c d = 0: In addition, R

s (0) > 0 and R

d (0) = 0:
Finally, di¤erentiating Rd (vl) with respect to vl, we get:
dRd (vl)
dvl
= kF

vl
vh
k
d

+ vh
Z k
d
vl
vh
k
d
xf (x) dx
dd
dvl
;
and
lim
vl!vh c
dRd (vl)
dvl
< k
since limvl!vh c dd=dvl < 0:
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) When c = 0, condition (i) of Lemma 1 and condition (i) of Lemma 2 hold,
and therefore s = d = 1. Furthermore, R

s (vl) = max fvlk; vhS (k)g and Rd (vl) = vlk+vhS (k) 
vhS

vl
vh
k

. Suppose rst that vlk  vhS (k). Then, Rs (vl) = vlk and Rd (vl)  Rs (vl). Otherwise,
suppose that vlk < vhS (k). Then, Rs (vl) = vhS (k) and Rd (vl) = vlk + R

s (vl)   vhS

vl
vh
k

.
Rd (vl)  Rs (vl), because vlvhk  S

vl
vh
k

(from the denition of the expected sales function). (ii)
Following the same steps of Lemma 3, we get that
s =
k
h 1

c
vh
 :
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Therefore, the limc!vh s exists and is unique. To nd the limit, observe that, when c ! vh,
limc!vh c=vh =  and we must have Z k
s
0
xf (x) dx = ;
which implies that limc!vh
k
s
= 1 or limc!vh s = 0. Furthermore, since s  d (vl) 8vl and
d 2 [0; 1] ; limc!vh d (vl) = 0. For the revenues, when s = 0, Rs (vl) = max fvlk; 0g = vlk and
when d = 0, R

d (vl) = vlk.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that the rm preannounced a set of prices A and that based
on this set, x high-type consumers visit the rm. Partition the set A to two disjoint sets,
A = A1 [ A2, such that A1 = fp 2 Ajp  vlg and A2 = fp 2 Ajp > vlg. Given that x high-type
consumers visited, the rm can choose to serve only high-type consumers, by choosing a price
p 2 A2 (if exists) or to serve both consumer types, by choosing a price p 2 A1 (if exists). Suppose
there exist two prices, p1 2 A2 and p2 2 A2, where p1 > p2. Because the choice of a price among
A2 will not a¤ect , setting p1 strictly dominates p2: Similarly, suppose there exist two prices,
p3 2 A1 and p4 2 A1, where p3 > p4. Because the rm is guaranteed to sell k units by choosing
any price among A1, setting p3 strictly dominates p4:
Proof of Theorem 4. For the two general prices (pl; ph), such that pl  ph, pl  vl and ph  vh
the revenue function is given by
R (pl; ph) = plk + ph

S

k


  S

pl
ph
k


;
where  is given by
vh   ph

S

k


+
ph   pl

Z pl
ph
k

0
xf (x) dx = c: (15)
(1) ps = max

vl; p
h
	
. If ps = vl, then Bs = B. If ps = ph, then (15) implies that s   and
R (vl; ps)  Rs, because s   and because maxp2B fR (p; x; )g  maxp2B0 fR (p; x; )g if B0  B;
(2) First note that from the assumption that Rd is increasing in vl, we get that
dRd
dvl
=
@Rd
@vl
+
@Rd
@d
@d
@vl
(16)
= kF (y) + vh
Z k
d
y
xf (x) dx  d

1
vl
  c
(vh   vl)2 y2f (y)

 0;
where y = vlvh
k
d
. To prove the property, we need to show that dR (pl; ph) =dpl  0. Let z = plph
k
 .
Di¤erentiating, we get:
@R (pl; ph)
@pl
= kF (z) ;
25
@R (pl; ph)
@
= ph
Z k

z
xf (x) dx
and from the Implicit Function Theorem,
@
@pl
=  
(ph   pl) zpl zf(z) 
R z
0 xf (x) dx
(ph   pl) z2f(z) + (vh   ph) kF

k

 :
As @R(pl;ph)@pl  0 and
@R(pl;ph)
@  0, the result follows immediately if @@pl  0. It remains to show
that dR (pl; ph) =dpl  0 if @@pl < 0. Note that because (vh   ph)
k
F

k


 0, when @@pl < 0,
@
@pl
 

1
pl
 
R z
0 xf (x) dx
(ph   pl) z2f(z)

= 
0@ 1
pl
 
c  (vh   ph)S

k


(vh   vl)2 z2f (z)
1A
 

1
pl
  c
(vh   vl)2 z2f (z)

:
Note that the last term is equivalent to the derivative @d@pl of dynamic pricing in (16), where vl = pl
and vh = ph. Thus, if Rd is increasing, it must be that
@R(pl;ph)
@pl
 0.
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